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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
AGENCY - FAMILY PURPOSE DOCTRINE - LIABILITY OF WIFE
FOR HUSBAND'S NEGLIGENT OPERATION OF AUTOMOBILE. - Plain-
tiff sued W for personal injuries sustained from negligent opera-
tion by H of a family automobile owned by W but maintained by
H. Hetd, that W, although having no independent income, is liable
under the family purpose doctrine. Wyant v. Phillips.'
Since the case of Jones v. Cook,2 West Virginia has firmly
adhered to the family purpose doctrine.3 Although ostensibly
based on the agency principle of respondeat superior the true ex-
planation of the rule is the underlying policy of the court to im-
pose liability upon a financially responsible person.4  Prior to the
principal case the local decisions, although extending the doctrine
to various family relationships, are justifiable under this policy.
Our cases have held the father liable under this doctrine for the
negligent operation of the family automobile by (1) a minor son,'
(2) an adult son,0 (3) a step-daughter.7 Here, however, in per-
mitting recovery from the wife, who has no independent income,
the court apparently ignores this reason."
Not all jurisdictions have gone as far as West Virginia in
the application of this doctrine.9 The Tennessee and Kentucky
courts, for example, although adhering to the doctrine, have denied
its application to similar facts.1" A number of states, however,
'179 S. E. 303 (W. Va. 1935).
2 90 W. Va. 710, 111 S. E. 828 (1922).
3 Ambrose v. Young, 100 W. Va. 425, 130 S. E. 810 (1925); Aggleson v.
Kendall, 92 W, Va. 138, 114 S. E. 454 (1922) ; Watson v. Burley, 105 W. Va.
416, 143 S. E. 95 (1928); Thalmon v. Schultze, 111 W. Va. 64, 106 S. E. 303
(1931). See Note (1922) 29 W. VA. L. Q. 53.
4 The case of Jones v. Cook, supra, says: "IThis doctrine puts the financial
responsibility of the owner behind the automobile while it is being used by
a member of the family who is likely to be financially irresponsible."
5 Jones v. Cook, supra n. 2.
6 Ambrose v. Young, supra n. 3.
7 Watson v. Burley, supra n. 3. Under strict rules of agency, the principal
who is held liable for the negligence of the agent has an action against the
agent. It would seem further objectionable in this case to allow a recovery
against the wife since our court follows the rule that one spouse cannot suo
another in tort, therefore leaving the wife without an action. See Poling v.
Poling, 179 S. E. 609 (W. Va. 1934).
s It is possible of course that the wife was financially responsible at least
to the extent of the value of the car or that she carried insurance thereon.
9 Smith v. Weaver, 73 Ind. App. 350, 124 N. E. 503 (1920); Surdock v.
Pittman, 165 Tenn. 17, 52 S. E. 155 (1931); Cewe v. Schmicki, 152 Minn.
126, 233 N. W. 805 (1930).
10 In Surdock v. Pittman, supra n. 9, the court says: "A wife onning an
automobile given her by her husband is not liable under the family purpose
doctrine for the negligent operation of the car by her husband, who was the
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wherein this doctrine is applied, are in accord with the principal
case."
It is believed that the instant case represents a tendency
toward absolute liability predicated upon ownership alone for the
negligent operation of the automobile by a third person. A few
states have by statute practically achieved this result.1
2
CRIMINAL LAW - INDICTMENT AS ACCESSORY BEFORE THE
FACT HELD SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION AS PRINCIPAL. -
Defendant, indicted as an accessory before the fact to murder,
was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. From an order of the
trial court discharging defendant on a writ of habeas corpus, the
sheriff brought error. Held, that an indictment for accessory be-
fore the fact to murder will sustain a conviction of voluntary man-
slaughter. Judgment reversed. Moore v. Lowe, Sheriff.1
The principal case purports to apply by analogy the rule of
State v. Prater- to the effect that a verdict of manslaughter under
a murder indictment, where the evidence is compatible only with
murder or innocence, will not be reversed. The thought is that
the accused should not be permitted to complain of the propensity
of the compassionate jury to convict of a lesser offense than the
evidence warrants.' As a matter or practical administration of
criminal law, the doctrine is not without merit. It involves, how-
head of the family, supporting his wife and himself, and who maintained the
car and who at the time of the accident was using it in his own business."
In an earlier decision, however, this same court had applied the family car
doctrine where a minor son was driving the family car. See King v. Smythe,
140 Tenn. 217, 204 S. E. 296 (1918).
'I Steele v. Ages' Adm'x, 233 Ky. 714, 26 S. E. 653 (1930); Venghis v.
Nathanson, 101 N. J. L. 110, 127 Atl. 175 (1925).
12 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1741 'A provides: "Every owner of a motor vehicle shall
be liable and responsible for the death of or injury to persons or property
resulting from negligence in the operation of such motor vehicle, in the business
of such owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with
the permission, express or implied, of such owner." In the case of O'Neil v.
Williams, 127 Cal. App. 385, 15 Pac. (2d) 879 (1932), this statute was applied
and the wife held liable on facts similar to those of the principal case. For
similar statutes see Codes of Michigan, Connecticut and New York. CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 1572; New York, CAHILL'S CONSOL. LAws (1930) c. 69A, § 59;
Micu. Co P. LAws (1915) § 4125.
1 180 S. E. 1 (W. Va. 1935).
2 52 W. Va. 132, 143, 43 S. E. 230 (1930).
" A defendant cannot be heard to complain of an error in his favor. State
v. Johnson, 111 W. Va. 653, 164 S. E. 31 (1932); State v. Prater, supra n. 2.
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